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This paper analyzes the effects of three alternative rules
on the long—run distributions of both the spot and futures prices in
a single commodity market, in which the key behavioral relationships
are derived from the optimizing behavior of producers and speculators.
The rules considered include: (i) leaning against the wind in the
spot market; (ii) utility maximizing speculative behavior by the
stabilization authority in the futures market; (iii) leaning against
the wind in the futures market. Since the underlying model is
sufficiently complex to preclude analytical solutions, the analysis
makes extensive use of simulation methods. As a general proposition
we find that intervention in the futures market is not as effective
in stabilizing either the spot price of the futures price as is inter-
vention in the spot market. Indeed, Rule (iii), while stabilizing the
futures price may actually destabilize the spot price. Furthermore, the
analogous type of rule undertaken in the spot market will always stabilize
the futures price to a greater degree than it does the spot price. The
welfare implications of these rules are also discussed. Our analysis
shows how these can generate rather different distributions of welfare
gains, including the overall benefits.
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The theory of commodity price stabilization has grown into a voluminous
literature. Many of the early studies analyze the question in terms of a buffer
stock stabilization scheme. The typical approach is to determine the allocation
of the welfare benefits to different groups in the economy following the introduc-
tion of such a scheme, with the stabilization authorities continually intervening
so as to ensure the exact stabilization of the market price at some appropriate
level (usually taken to be the arithmetic mean).
Of course the maintenance of a buffer stock scheme which stabilizes
prices perfectly is extremely expensive and accordingly is not very practicable.
In reality some sort of partial price stabilization scheme is more likely to be
adopted. In the literature, two alternative aspects have been considered. The
first is the intervention in the commodity market by means of some specified inter-
vention rule. The second is the consideration of alternative institutional arrange-
ments, such as futures markets, and the role they may play in stabilizing the spot
price. Until recently, these latter models have suffered from an important
deficiency. Specifically, they ignored the fact that any change in the environment——
such as the introduction of a futures market——alters the structure of the model and
this needs to be taken into account in assessing the effects of the institutional
change on the equilibrium behavior of the market. To do this requires the analysis
to be developed from the underlying microeconomic optimizing behavior.
In this paper, we analyze the effects of intervention by a stabilization
authority in both the spot and futures market. The effects on the properties of
both the spot and futures markets are considered. We also investigate the effects
of such action on the welfare of the various agents in the economy. The model
we employ is an extension of one developed by Turnovsky (1983) and refined by
Turnovsky and Campbell (l985). In this model, the key behavioral relationships
are derived from the optimizing behavior of producers and speculators. As a—2—
result of this behavior the coefficients of the relevant demand and supply func—
tions become endogenous and change with the degree of intervention by the authority.
Three kinds of intervention rules are considered. The first of these
postulates the stabilization authority to intervene in the spot market in accordance
with a rule of leaning against the wind; i.e., it buys the commodity when the price
is low, relative to its equilibrium, and sells otherwise. The second rule assumes
that the authority enters the futures market as a private speculator, taking a
long or short position, depending upon whether the futures price exceeds or is
less than the expected spot price. The final rule is one of leaning against the
wind in the futures market; i.e., buying futures contracts when their price is
low and selling when they are high. Such a rule was suggested some years ago by
Houthakker (1967).
The model underlying the analysis is sufficiently complex to render
analytical solution to be infeasible. We therefore analyze the questions using
simulation methods. While these techniques can yield only specific conclusions,
relevant to the specific chosen parameter values, when conducted over comprehensive
sets of parameter values, as we do here, they do provide an overall picture of what
the likely effects of the various stabilization rules will be. They also have
the advantage of indicating the likely orders of magnitudes of these effects and
providing some insight as to the crucial parameters upon which these depend.
Given the complexity of the model, this type of sensitivity analysis proves to
be intractable, without resorting to numerical solutions.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the model,
with its solution being given in Section 3. The welfare measures are reported in
Section 4. Section 5 discusses the simulation procedures. The effects of the
three rules upon the distribution of the spot and futures prices together with
their welfare effects are considered in Sections 6—8. The final section contains
the general conclusions to emerge from our analysis.—3—
2.REVIEW OF FRAMEWORK
This section summarizes the basic framework, developed in greater detail
by Turnovsky (1983) and Turnovsky and Campbell (1985). There are four groups of
participants in the market:(a) firms; (b) private speculators; (c) consumers;
(d) the public stabilization authority. The behavior of each group is considered
in turn and the corresponding aggregate market relationships are then derived.
A. Producers
We assume that there are n identical producers. The representative firm
is assumed to be perfectly competitive and to produce its output subject to a
quadratic cost function. In addition, at time t—l, when the production decision
must be made, the firm can enter a contract to deliver a fixed specified quantity
of output at an agreed contract price at time t.— The remainder is sold on the
spot market at whatever the random price may turn out to be. Its profit in
period t, Trk, is therefore given by
= — z_1]+ P_1 z_1 — cY (1)
where
=plannedoutput, chosen by the representative firm, and
upon which costs areincurred,
=actualoutput of the firm,
z_1 =firm'snet position in futures contracts entered into
at time t—l,
=spotprice of output at time t, taken as parameterically
given to the firm,
=oneperiod futures price prevailing at time t—l, for
delivery at time t.
If z. >0the firm is selling futures contracts, while z. <0denotes a
i,t—1 i,t—1
purchase of futures contracts.—4—
The firm is assumed to make its production decisions for time t at t—l,
before the actual spot price P is known. Because of random fluctuations in produc-
tion decisions, assumed to be beyond the control of the firm, actual and planned
outputs are related by1!
y. =y. +v. (2) it it it
where v is an additive random variable, having zero mean and finite variance.
Combining equations (1) and (2), the profit of the representative firm is
p — f 1—2
it =P[y+ v —z,_1]+ P1 z,_1 —- c1 (1
To preserve linearity of the model, we shall assume that the firm maxi-
mizes the following one—period function of expected profit and its variance
V Ei(1T) —avari(Tri) (3)
where
=conditionalexpectation of profit for time t,
formed at time t—l,
vari(ri) =Ei[r
—E1()]2conditional variance
of profit for time t, formed at time t—1.
Under certain conditions, the parameter a describes the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion. For a risk averse producer a >0,while a =0corresponds to risk
neutrality
From (li) we drive
E_i() =,t-lit
-z1i]+ E_i(Pt v1t) +—1 Z1
—cy (4a)





where var1, cov1. denote the conditional variance and covariance, respectively,
while
,t—l'
o2(t,t—l), denote the one period conditional mean and variance of the—5-
spot price for time t,formedat time t—l. Substituting these two expressions into
(3) and maximizing V with respect to y, we derive the following expressions
for the optimal planned output and position in the futures market.
=-1 (5a)




Theimplications of these two pairs of equations for producers have been discussed
elsewhere .-'
B.Speculators
There are n identical speculators. The representative, denoted by j,
holds a certain quantity of the inventories of the commodity in anticipation of
price changes. We shall let i1 denote the net position in the commodity by
the speculator entered at time t—l. If i1 >0,the speculator holds positive
stocks of the commodity for speculative purposes, while1j,t—1 <0denotes that he
is holding the commodity short. In addition, we assume he can speculate in the
purchase and sales of futures contracts. We shall letx_1 denote the net posi-
tion of the representative speculator in the futures market entered at time t—l,
with x
—l
>0denoting sales and x—l
<0denoting purchases of futures con-
•j,t j,t
tracts,respectively. The profit of the representative speculator over the period
(t—l, t)ispostulated to be
- + - -di_i (6)
wherethe quadratic term denotes the costs associated with trading in inventories.L
While the assumption of quadratic costs is a gross simplification, introduced to
preserve linearity, the requirement d >0is necessary for a well defined inventory
demand function, in the presence of a futures market, to exist.
Analogous to firms, the objective function of the representative specu-
lator is to maximize—6—
s -. f
V i(P —p )+x (P
—P' ) it j,t—l t,t—l t—l j,t—i t—l t,t—i
-4 di_1
-4 o(tt_i)(i tl -x_1)2
(7)
The parametermeasures the degree of risk aversion and need bear no particular





= 4_ - +s2i
(P_1 — (8b)
These equationsare parallel to (5a) and (5b) derived above for the firm and have
beendiscussed previously.
The assumption of a single period decision horizon is adopted to preserve
simplicity. However, given the specifications of the profit functions in (1) and (6),
(which involve only the current values of the decision variables), identical demand
functions are obtained with a multiperiod objectivefunction.'
C. Aggregate Market Relationships
The agents collectively trade in the final goods market and in the
futures market. These shall therefore be considered in turn.
The third group of market participants, consumers, are assumed to pur-
chaseonly final goods. It is not necessary to derive their demand functions from
underlying utility maximization. Instead, it suffices simply to postulate some
aggregate demand function, Dt, which most conveniently can be taken to be linear
Dt =A—aP+u (9)
Summing the optimal production plans (5), over the identical firms leads




Since the n firms are assumed to be identical they also are assumed to contribute
equally to the aggregate supply disturbance, Vt, so that
fl V. =V (11) p it t




Theaggregate demand and aggregate supply disturbances are assumed to
be additive, normally independently distributed over time, to have zero means
and finite covariances, and to be uncorrelated
E(ut) E(vt) =0 (13a)
E(u) =o; E(v) = ;E(uv) =0 (13b)
Likewise, summing over the demand functions for the individual speculators
leads to the aggregate inventory demand function 1tl'
't-l
= -
_l(pf p) (14) d t—1 t—l
where we have redefined d/n as d.
S
The specification of the output market is completed by the introduction
of the market clearing condition
++ =S+ (15)
where Gt denotes the position taken by the stabilization authority in the market.
If G > 0, the authority is a net purchaser of the commodity, adding to its inventory;
if <0,itis a net seller, running down its inventory.
Aggregating over the representative firm's position in the futures market,
(5b), leads to the following aggregate net supply function for futures contracts
byfirms f
=
- +a c0Vt_1 + — (16)
ao(t,t—l)—8—
whereZ1 represents the aggregate. In the rational expectations equilibrium we
consider, the current spot price deviates from what was previously anticipated by
an amount which is linearly proportional to the aggregate demand and supply disturbances.
Thus we may write
= + P1u + P2v (17)
where p1, p2, are determined below. Using (11), (13) and (17), as well as the
fact that u, v are normal and uncorrelated, we find that
,
2
2 t,t—l v covi(P,Pv.) = n (18)
p
Also, it is evident from (26a) below that the probability distribution of is
2
stationary so that the one period variance o(t,t-.-1) is independent of t and
shall simply be noted by 02(1). Thus substituting (18) into (16) and redefining




Likewise, summing (Sb) over the futures positions for individual speculators,
leads to the aggregate position
= - P1)+ (P - (19b)
where analogously we have defined d and 5.
Equilibrium in the futures market is described by
Z1 + = (20)
where Ht_l denotes the net position taken by the stabilization authority in the
futures market. If Htl >0,it is taking a long position; if H1 <0it is
selling the contracts short.
Substituting the relevant demand and supply functions into the goods mar-
ket and futures market equilibrium conditions yields the following pair of stochastic
difference equations in the spot and futures prices
A —aP+(P
—P)+Gt =-+ (P_1—-3) — e (2la)—9—
+ - + - +ci = (21b)
ci(1) ci(1) P p _1 1 where k =(—+-)
e u —
2 2 2
E(e )= 0,ci= ci + ci
Thesolutions for P and P depend upon the specific forms for the intervention rules
for spot and futures market intervention and to these rules we now turn.
D. Specification of Intervention Rules
13/
The following three intervention rules are considered:
Rule 1: Ct =_A(P
— F) (22a)
This rule asserts that the stabilization authority buys the commodity when the
current spot price is below its long—run equilibrium and sells when this situation
is reversed. It describes a type of "leaning against the wind" policy commonly
encountered in the stabilization literature in general)' The case of a buffer
stock stabilization scheme, when the intervention of the authority maintains
at F, is obtained by letting X -*
Rule2: Htl
- '> 0 (22b)
Rule 2 is analogous to the demand function for futures contracts by a pure private
speculator. This form of intervention therefore assumes that the stabilization
authority is behaving as if it were a pure private utility maximizing speculator.
Rule 3: H1 = -f) (22c)
The form of intervention suggested by Rule 3 is the analogue to Rule 1 applied to
the futures market. It asserts that the stabilization authority sells futures con-
tracts when their price is above the long run mean and buys them when they are
below the mean. This is a formalization of the type of rule suggested by
Houthakker (1967)—10-
3.SOLUTION FOR SPOT AND FUTURES PRICES
Since the objective is to assess the impacts of the various intervention
schemes on the market and its participants, as a benchmark, we begin with the
case where there is no intervention by the authority in either the spot or futures
markets. Setting G =Htl
=0in (21a) and (2lb), we obtain
A -aP+(P -= - + -(P1- e (21a')
P_l ,+
- +2k(P_1 -,t-l
+ = 0 (21b')
c(1)
p p
We define the long—run average spot price, attained when expectations are realized
=,t—l
== P)by P and the long—run futures price by.Itfollows













where for notational convenience we let
- 1/cd
a1 =a+





p —— (24b) 2cd






Observe from (23b) that in the absence of supply disturbances, the long—run average
futures price is in general below the long—run average spot price. This is necessary
in order to induce producers to hedge permanently part of their output. In the—11—
presence of supply disturbances, however, the negative correlation between them
and the spot price reduces the incentive for firms to nedge by selling futures
contracts, thereby reducing their supply and raising the futures price. Indeed,
it is now possible for the equilibrium futures price to exceed the spot price.
The long—run bias will disappear if either ÷0,
-'-
Next,we define the following variables in deviation form, Pt —
— p,p p — Substitutingfor from the futures market
equilibrium condition, the following difference equation is obtainea for the spot













Equation (25) describes the behavior of the current market clearing price in terms of
its conditional expectations. Using standard solution procedures, the stable solution









Taking conditional expectations of (26a), and subtracting, we can immediately show
that p1. p2 appearing in (17) are defined by
—l —p =p = 1 2a1 +w(1—r)+pr










(l—r )[a1+ w(l—r) + r] l—r
where r is the smaller root of (26b) and a1, b, w andare given by (24a)—(24d).
From the expressions (24a)—(24d) it is seen that the parameters a1, b, ,
ware endogenous functions of the one period spot price variance02(1), and
therefore of o and r. As a consequence, equations (26b) and (27b) define a pair
of highly nonlinear relationships between o and r. As pointed out in a related
context by McCafferty and Driskill (1980), this nonlinearity is the cause of
possible nonuniqueness and nonexistence problems pertaining to rational expecta-
tions equilibria. That is, when we take the definitions of a1, b,and w, given
by (24a)—(24d) into account, it is possible that there is in fact no value of r
lying in the range 0 <r<1;or alternatively, there may be a multiplicity of
such roots. This question is considered further below.
Using the steady state relationship (23b) to write (2lb') in deviation
form, and taking expectations of (25), the current futures price can be expressed
in terms of the past spot price as -2












Thusgiven (25), the evolution of is determined. From this it followsthat
theasymptotic variance of the futures price, o, is
222
of =1•1
and a similar relationship holds between the corresponding one period variances.
Consequently, in the case of demand disturbances fl2 <1and the futures price has 1es
variance than the spot price, both iitheshort run and in the long run. In the case
of supply disturbances, however, it is possible for >1,in which case the futures
price may actually exhibit more variability.
The solution for the spot and futures prices, derived in the absence of inter-
























































These 11 equations determine between them the solutions for the 11 quantities P.
,cY,02(1), o, r, p,a1, b, w, and .Itis possible, by substitution, to
reduce the number of variables, although for expositional purposes it is convenient
to lay out the structure of the solution in full.
We turn now to the solutions obtained for the three alternative forms of
intervention rules. It turns out that the forms of the solution in each case can
be expressed in terms of relatively minor adjustments to the basic solution.
Rule 1
Substituting (22a) into the spot market clearing condition, the solution
consists of the following equations:(28b), (28c), (28d), (28e), (28f), (28g),








which again determine the 11 endogenous variables. In deriving this solution, the
critical thing to observe is that this form of intervention leads to a transitional
dynamic equation in the spot price, identical to that obtained in the absence of
intervention ((26) above), with the difference being that the coefficient a (the
slope of the demand function) is increased to (a +X);see (28h'). Combining
(28a') with (28h1) and likewise (28a) with (28g), we see that in either case, the
steady—state solution for P can be written as
a+k
0(1)
In particular, P does not depend upon the intervention parameter A through the
effect of the latter on a, as during the transitional path. The mean spot and
futures prices do, however, depend indirectly on A via the effect which operates
through the one period variance of the spot price 02(1).—15--
Rule 2
Substituting (22b) into the futures market clearing condition (21b) we
find that this form of futures market intervention is equivalent to replacing the
coefficient k/a2(l), which describes the degree of private speculation, by
k+ is therefore equivalent to a reduction in the degree of risk
a (1)
aversion of the private sector. The entire solution is of the same form as (28a)—(28i),
the only difference being that kIa(1) is now replaced by k/a2(l) + .Inthis case,
the mean spot and future prices are now directly influenced by the intervention
parameter v, as well as indirectly through the variance a(l), as in Rule 1.
Rule 3
Substituting the third rule (22c) into the futures market equilibrium
condition (2lb), it turns out that the modifications introduced by this rule to
the basic solution (28a)—(28i) are somewhat more substantial than in the other





















































In contrast to the analogous rule for spot market intervention, Rule 1, this form
of intervention in the futures market has direct effects on all three parameters
(a1,b,). While an increase in p raises a1,which can be shown to be a stabilizing
effect on the spot price, it also reduces b and u, and these changes can be shown























equivalent to an increase in a and therefore to be stabilizing. In addition, there
are the indirect effects of these changes operating through 02(1).
4. WELFARE MEASURES
In order to assess the distribution of welfare gains or losses arising
from government intervention, it is necessary to introduce welfare criteria for
the respective agents in the market. These include the three private agents (firms,
speculators, and consumers) as well as the profits accruing to the stabilization
authority. The traditional approach in the stabilization literature has been to
evaluate welfare gains and losses in terms of changes in producer's and consumer's
surplus. The limitations of these measures are well known, and while it can be
shown that the qualitative implications they yield are generally acceptable, it
is preferable to carry Out the welfare analysis in terms of the underlying functions.
The underlying welfare maximizing approach of the present study allows us
to move away from surplus measures, at least in the cases of firms and speculators,
to welfare measures based on means and variances of the profits accruing to the
respective groups. As we have simply assumed an aggregate demand function, with-
out resorting to underlying utility maximization, we have retained the traditional
consumer's surplus measure as an indicator of welfare gains or losses to consumers.
As we shall see below, it is impossible to make any kind of general qualitative
assessment of the welfare gains, without resorting to numerical methods. The
analytical complexities, present in the price variance comparisons, are simply
compounded.
We turn now to the expressions for the welfare gains for the three groups
in the economy. These are evaluated at long—run equilibria, by taking asymptotic
expectations of the welfare expressions. In the case of producers and speculators,
21/ the derivations of the resulting expressions are tedious and are not reported.——18—
A. Producers
The welfare function for the representative firm is given by (4). The
analogous expression for total firms is therefore
=E1(fl)
-avar l(ll) (29)
where Ei(fl) vari(iI), denote one period means and variance of aggregate
producer profits. One issue associated with the use of (29) for the purposesof
making welfare comparisons with other agents in the economy is the fact that
embodied in the expression vari(11) are terms involving fourth moments (and
squares of the second moments) of the distribution of the spot price.These are
not present in the consumer surplus measure, which is analogous to expected profits.
The measure (29) thus attributes greater weight to stability thereby perhaps giv-
ing a distorted comparison with consumer welfare, as measured by consumer surplus.
To obtain the most complete picture of overall welfare effects, it is useful to
consider the effects of the futures market on
(i) the asymptotic expected profit of the firm, E(fl);
(ii) the asymptotic one—period variance of profit of firms,
var
(iii) the asymptotic welfare of firms as defined by the asymptotic
expectation of the utility function, E(V).














+ w(l-r)+r] p J
[f(1)-()J2+[r(x-1) +x]22()
Var[R(l;I)] = 2
1 2p +2o2o2(I)(l-r2) (30b)
- ao(l;I)
v p—19--
E[V(I)J =E[ll(I)]-- Var[fl(1;I)] (30c)
where I1, 2, 3 refers to the three intervention rules and I =0denotes no
intervention.' Theexpressions for P(I), P, o, 02(1), r, a1, w, ,are
derived from (28). In the case of no intervention or intervention by Rule 1,
x1
and x2 are given by
2
k _____
2 2 1 c(l) a(l)
= p = d





In the case of Rule 2,
x1andx2 are given by (31) withk/c2(l) being replaced by
k/a2(l) + .Inthe case of Rule 3, the numerators in (31) are unchanged; the
denominators are now replaced by (k/a2(l) + 1/c + l/d + p).
The gains or losses to firms are obtained by comparing (30) in the case
where there is no intervention with the corresponding expressions obtained under
the three forms of intervention rules. The long run impacts of intervention on
these welfare measures are therefore
=Z(I)—Z(0) Z =E(fl),VarT[(l) ,E(V)
1= 1, 2, 3
B. Speculators
The procedure for deriving the welfare gains or losses to speculators is
directly analogous to that for firms. The welfare function of the representative
speculator is given by (7) with an analogous expression applying in the aggregate.
Again it is useful to focus on (1) asymptotic expected speculative profits; (ii)
asymptotic one—period variance of speculative profits; (iii) asymptotic welfare
as specified by the utility function. These expressions are:








E[V5(I)] =E[flS(I)]- var[IIS(l;I)J (32c)
The long—run expected profits of the futures markets on these quantities are
therefore
Z(F)
—Z(N);Z =E[115],var[IIS(l)], V (33)
C.Consumers
As noted above, when considering the gains or losses received by con-
sumers through the introduction of a futures market, we resort to the traditional
surplus measure. The gain in consumer surplus (CS) from intervention in the futures
market is given by
D(P ')dP'
With a linear demand function, and taking expected values, the expected gains to
consumers from the introduction of a futures market are
E(CS)=E{[P(0)
-P(I)][D(P(O)) + D(P(I))]} . (34)









where the subscripts I, 0 identify the intervention regime. One interesting feature
about (35), that is different from the usual surplus measures which now abound in
the literature, is that it consists of two components. The first, and less familiar,
is due to the shift in the long—run average price. The second is the contribution
to the welfare gains from the stabilization of the spot price, and this of course
is familiar from previous stabilization literature.—21—
D. Stabilization Authority
The gains to the stabilization authority from intervention denoted by
AG, are straightforward, namely
Rule 1: E[X(P —P)P] Xe2 (36a)
Rule 2: E[v(P_1 — — +
[r(x1—1) + x2]2eJ (36b)
Rule 3: E[p(P1 -1)(P1
- = (rx1+ x2)(r(x1-l) + x2)a (26c)
E. Total Welfare Gains
In our welfare results below, two measures of both total private and over-
all welfare gains are presented. The first measure of total private gains is the
sum of the expected changes in the profits of producers and speculators, together
23/
with the expected change in consumer surplus, namely—
AE(IT) =E(II)+ AE(IIS) + AE(CS) (37a)
The second is the corresponding sum of the changes in expected utility
AE(V) =AE(V)+ AE(VS) + AE(CS) (37b)
The corresponding expressions for overall welfare gains are these expressions,
together with the return to the stabilization authority
AE(TTT) =AE(fl)+ AG (38a)
AE(VT) =AE(V)+ AG (38b)
5. SIMULATION PROCEDURE
Numerical solutions for the non—intervention case and the three inter-
vention rules were obtained by assigning numerical values to the basic parameters——
24 /
a,c, d, c and 3, and the intervention parameters. The resulting expressions
for P, 2 were then used to obtain the corresponding numerical values for the welfare
gains. The range of parameters considered is given in Table 1. As A and 2, act
only as scale parameters in the solutions for the price distribution, they were—2 2--
assigned constant values set arbitrarily at 10 and 1, respectively. The case where
the fluctuations in et are due to fluctuations in demand is specified by
2 2 2 . . 2 2 2 == 1,o=0;while for supply fluctuations o =a=1,a =0.
e U v e V u
The results are more sensitive to the other parameters including the intervention
parameters, which were therefore allowed to vary over a wider range.
As demand and supply characteristics of commodities tend to vary, not
only between different commodities, but also across countries for a given commodity,
we try to cover a wide range of slopes for the relevant demand and supply functions.
This of course will also provide some insight into the generality of any particular
result which may arise. Indeed, given the small number of parameters involved, it
is possible to approach generality in the results without resorting to a prohibitive
number of simulations.
The values assigned to the parameters a, c and d are self—explanatory.
They allow the implied slopes of the demand and supply functions to span a wide
range. For example, the slope of the demand function ranges from 0.1 to 10,
which is an increase of 100—fold. The rate of increase in the marginal cost of hold-
ing inventories, d, ranges between 0.2 and 4, which is a factor of 20.
The choice of values for ct.and ,thecoefficients or risk aversion, is
not so straightforward. While the degree of risk aversion is likely to vary between
producers and speculators and across industries, the literature is unclear as to
what reasonable values of a andshould be, although there is some agreement that
the values are probably small. The consensus among authors would seem to be that
these risk parameters should lie in the range 0.0001 to 0.1; see Freund (1956), Peck
(1975), King and Robison (1981), Buccola (1981), Rolfo (1980), Kramer and Pope (1981),
Yassour, Zilberman, and Rausser (1981). We consider values of the risk parameters
a andbetween 0.001 and 0.1. We find that for values of a, <0.001the results
are difficult to distinguish from the case of risk neutrality which is one of the
special cases considered by Turnovsky (1983).It would therefore seem reasonable to—23—
conclude that if a andare extremely small, the special cases of a == 0are
good proxies. The upper bound of 0.1 is probably too high. Nevertheless it enables
us to conduct sensitivity analysis as the risk parameters change from the more reason-
able values of 0.01.
The simulation procedure adopted was as follows:
(i) solveffor the non—intervention solution (02, 02f r,
and P ),forgiven parameters
p
(ii) then solve for the intervention solutions for each
of the three rules;
(iii) use solutions from (i) and (ii) to compare variances
of the spot price and futures price and to compute
welfare gains and losses.
Taking into account different combinations of the parameters set out in Table 1
and a search for multiple feasible roots set out in the next section, the total
number of simulations carried out exceeded 4300.
The large number of simulations carried out enables us to draw some fairly
general conclusions about the behavior of a futures market subject to intervention
by a stabilization authority. Obviously it is impossible to present the results
of all experiments. In order to get some idea of the dispersion of results, a
number of representative cases are presented. For purposes of exposition, 10 cases
are presented in detail (for each intervention rule). Parameter values for each
case are presented in Table 2. Table 3 contains solutions applicable to the parameters
in Table 2, assuming no intervention.-'1 The solutions provide a point of comparison
with the intervention solutions. For each rule we have considered 4 values of the inter-
vention parameter, 0.5, 1, 10, 100, thereby covering a wide dispension of degrees of
intervention. However, results for only 0.5, 10 are presented in the tables.'
Before turning to a discussion of each of the three rules, we briefly consider the
question of non—existence and multiple solutions.—24—
The rational expectations procedure adopted in this paper is consistent
27/
with the possibility that multiple solutions may exist:—Of particular interest
is the possibility that intervention by a stabilization authority may result in
non—existence or the creation of multiple feasible solutions. The numerical frame-
work employed in this paper provides a convenient framework for analyzing the
existence or otherwise of multiple solutions.
The algorithm used to solve for intervention solutions provides only one
solution for each unknown and does not provide an indication as to the uniqueness
of such solutions. Solutions are obtained by an iterative procedure which requires
the provision of a set of initial conditions. For feasibility we require
0 < r1, r2 < 1
Initial conditions were therefore set in the range 0 to 1 with a grid search being
carried out with alternative initial conditions within the range. No examples of
multiple feasible solutions were found in the presence of intervention. Further-
more, numerous examples àf nonfeasible solutions, after intervention, were found
for particular initial conditions, but a unique feasible solution could always
be found by using alternative initial conditions. The absence of multiple feasible
solutions and the fact that intervention does not lead to existence problems is of
some importance in a practical policy context.
6. RULE 1:C =—X(P—P) t t
Theresults pertaining to Rule 1, where the stabilization authorities are
assumed to intervene in the spot market, are set out in Tables 4 and 5. The solu-
tions for the means and variances of the spot and futures prices are given in Table 4.
The percentage differences refer to the differences between the intervention solu-
tions and the corresponding nonintervention solutions presented in Table 3. The
welfare results are reported in Table 5.In both cases, the effects for demand
disturbances and supply disturbances are given separately. The values of the inter-
vention parameters X =0.5,=10proxy TTlOW? and high" degrees of intervention,
respectively.—25—
A. Effects on Long—Run Distributions of Prices
As one would expect, intervention in the spot market by means of Rule 1
results in the stabilization of both the spot and futures prices. Interestingly,
very large reductions in the variances of both the spot and futures prices can be
achieved for a relatively low degree of intervention; see, e.g., A =0.5,.Cases land
3.Eut it is also possible for negligible stabilization to be achieved for A =0.5.
Examples of this are given in Cases 2 and 8, which have in common a high value of
a, but very different degrees of risk aversion. For relatively intensive intervention,
the effect of a high a is swamped and it can be seen from Table 4 that for A =10
a high degree of stabilization of both the spot and futures price can be achieved
for all parameter combinations.
It is of interest to note that while significant reductions in both
variances can be achieved, the futures price is always stabilized to a greater
degree than the spot price——even though the intervention occurs directly in the
spot market. The reason for this can be seen from (28e). The intervention impinges
on the variance of the futures price in two ways. First, it reduces the variance
of the spot price. Secondly, by reducing the one—period variance of the spot price,
it increases both the numerator and the denominator of n,thecoefficient of
It can be shown that on balance the effect on the denominator dominates., so that n
falls,leading to a relatively greater stabilization of the futures market.
In terms of variance reduction it would appear that for particular parameter
combinations, little can be gained by increasing the degree of intervention beyond
A =1.This is so, for example, for Cases 1, 3, and 10, which are typified by very
low values of a. Furthermore, comparing the reductions in the variances in Tables
4A and 4B it is seen that intervention in accordance with Rule 1 is approximately
equally effective in stabilizing for demand disturbances as it is for supply disturbances
The qualitative effect of intervention by means of Rule 1 on the long—run
mean prices depends critically upon the source of origin of the stochastic disturbances.—26—
In the case of demand shocks, the mean spot price is always lowered, while the mean
futures price is always raised. The reason for this is seen from (28). The inter-
vention reduces both the long-run and the one period variance of the spot price.
While this tends to reduce a1, there is a more than offsetting increase in b, so
that a1 ÷brises, thereby lowering the long—run mean spot price P. At the same
time, the coefficient of P in (28b) is increased, by a more than offsetting amount
and the long—run mean futures price tends to rise. In the case of supply disturbances,
the intervention may cause the long—run mean prices to either rise or fall. The
reason is that whereas a1 will still fall, b may now either rise or fall, render-
ing the net effect on the mean spot price P indeterminate. However, in all cases,
the spot and futures prices move in opposite ways (as they do for demand disturbances).
In comparison with the reductions in the variances, which we showed could
be significant, the changes in the mean spot and futures prices are relatively
small. The greatest reduction in the spot price achieved for all parameter sets
was around 20 percent. The changes in the futures price are all much smaller,
the maximum being less than 6%.
In concluding our comments on the price effects, the following observa-
tions may be made. Whereas, the intervention appears to stabilize both demand and
supply disturbances equally effectively, the intervention has a relatively greater
impact on mean prices when disturbances originate with demand than when they are
due to supply shocks. Secondly, reductions in the mean prices are fairly insensi-
tive to varying degrees of intervention. Thirdly, as intervention increases, the
mean spot and futures prices converge to a common value for a particular set of
parameter values. Indeed, for A =100,(not reported) the spot and futures prices
are identical for each particular set of parameters. Finally, the reason why
intervention has such a large impact on both variances but a relatively small
impact on both mean prices can be explained by the fact that intervention by means
of Rule 1 has only an indirect effect on the means prices, whereas it impacts on
the variances directly.—27—
B. Welfare Effects
Since the welfare criteria introduced in Section 4 involve the asymptotic
means and variances the prices, the results we have just been considering are the
key inputs in determining the welfare effects within the economy of the interven-
tion rule. The welfare of the various agents shall be discussed in turn.
Producers:
(i) The welfare of producers as measured by expected profit, can either
increase or decrease with intervention. For most parameter sets, when disturbances
originate with demand, expected profit tends to fall with intervention, while for
supply disturbances, expected profit tends to rise. These findings reflect the
stabilizing effect of intervention on the price level and are consistent with the
usual results of the buffer stock stabilization literature. The exceptions to
this pattern are marginal, except Parameter Set 1, where expected profit fall
quite sharply with intervention in the presence of supply disturbances. This
particular result is a consequence of the fall in the spot price, together with
the only modest increase in the futures price.
(ii) Intervention tends to stabilize the profit of firms (i.e., reduce
its one period variance) in the presence of demand disturbances and generally, but
not always, destabilize it in the presence of supply shocks. The reduction in the
variance of the spot and futures prices are obviously stabilizing. But the variance
of profit also depends upon (f —p)2This tends to be reduced by intervention in
the case of demand disturbances and to be increased in the case of supply shocks.
In the former case, the stabilizing effects of the reduced variance of price is
reinforced; in the latter case it is offset.
(iii) The welfare of producers, as measured by E(V) generally falls in
the case of demand disturbances and rises in the case of supply disturbances. The
losses in the former case are less than those of expected profit. This is because
intervention tends to stabilize producer profit in that case. Likewise, the gains—28—
in the latter case are less than those of expected profit. This is due to the
destabilizing effect of intervention on profit associated with supply disturbances.
Consumers:
Consumers gain from intervention when the stochastic fluctuations originate
with demand. They may either gain or lose when the fluctuations are due to supply
disturbances. They usually lose when the fluctuations are due to supply disturbances,
aithouth, in the latter case they can also make significant gains. The magnitude
of the effects to consumers reflect the behavious of the mean and variance of the
spot price. The reduction in the mean price tends to benefit them,while the
reduction in the variance tends to harm them. The significant gains experienced
for Parameter Set 3 are due primarily to the large reduction in the mean spot price
(18% and 12% for demand and supply disturbances respectively) which occurs in that
case. Since the reductions in the means through intervention are smaller under
supply disturbances, the benefits to consumers are smaller in that case. It is
also possible that increased intervention turns consumer gains into losses; see,
e.g., Parameter Set 1 for A =0,5,A =10.This is because in the presence of
supply disturbances, intervention can actually raise the mean spot price, thereby
adversely affecting consumers.
Speculators:
(i) The expected profits of speculators always decline with intervention
when disturbances originate with demand. The same applies in the case of supply
disturbances for all but Parameter Set 1. The reduction in the variance of the
spot price, resulting from intervention, tends to reduce the expected profit of
speculators. But their expected profit also depends positively upon(f —
see(32a). As noted, this tends to decline with intervention in the case of demand
disturbances, so that the expected profit of speculators is reduced unambiguously
in that case. However, it tends to be increased in the case of supply shocks,—29—
thereby offsetting the losses from more stable spot price. Indeed, in the case of
Parameter Set 1, this effect can dominate leading to gains to speculators.
(ii) The one period variance of speculative profits are almost always
reduced through intervention, in the case of demand disturbances and usually increase
in the case of supply disturbances. Exceptions in both cases do exist. The reason
involves the effects of intervention on the variance of the spot price and the
divergence between the long—run mean spot and futures prices.
(iii) The welfare of speculators as measured by their overall utility
function E(VS) is always reduced by intervention in the case of demand disturbances
and usually falls in the case of supply disturbances. Parameter Set 1 is theexcep-.
tion for all degrees of intervention.
Total Private Welfare:
(i) Total private welfare effects, as measured by tE(IT) are almost always
positive for both disturbances. Exceptions are Parameter Set 5 for demand disturbances
and Parameter Set 8 for supply disturbances, when small losses are incurred when
intervention is weak. These losses, however, are converted to gains withmore
intensive intervention (A >1).The overall private gains are larger in the case
of supply disturbances than for demand disturbances.
(ii) Total private welfare effects as measured by AE(V) are always positive
in the case of demand disturbances, although there may be losses in thecase of
supply disturbances, through the increases in the variances in producer and
speculator profits. More intensive intervention does not eliminate the losses
as measured in this way, and indeed may intensify them.
Government:
The government always ensures itself an expected profit from intervening
in accordance with Rule 1.For a given degree of intervention, their gains are
marginally higher for supply disturbances, than they are for demand disturbances.—30—
For very high degrees of intervention (A =100)gains become small. This of course
is due to the fact that although A gets large, the subsequent decline in the
variance of the spot price more than offsets this. The relationship between the
intervention parameter A, and gains to the government is nonlinear. For example,
for Parameter Set 2 gains to the government are increased as A increases from 0.5
to 1 to 10, before subsequently declining. There is therefore an optimal degree
of intervention form the viewpoint of maximizing governmentrevenue.'
Total Welfare:
(i) Total welfare as measured by expected profits is always positive.
Total welfare as measured by E(VT) is always positive in the case of demand
disturbances and with the exception of Parameter Set 1, in the case of supply
disturbances as well. In this case the losses to producers are not compensated
by the gains to the other agents in the economy.
7.RULE 2: H =)(pf—p* ) t—l t—l t,t—1
We consider now Rule 2, whereby the stabilization authority behaves as
a utility maximizing agent. In contrast to Rule 1, we find that in general,
stabilization is virtually ineffective for all degrees of intervention in terms
of variance reduction and changes in the mean price. Indeed, Rule 2 is so ineffec-
tive that only 2 of the 10 representative cases are worth reporting. Both of
these cases (Parameter Sets 1 and 3) are associated with high risk aversion and
inelastic demand. These are set Out in Tables 6 and 7. Theeffectof Rule 2
on the distribution of prices and welfare for all other parameter sets is virtually
zero.
A. Effects on Long—Run Distributions of Prices
Intervention via Rule 2hasthe effect of stabilizing the spot and futures
prices. In the case of demand disturbances, the mean spot price is reduced, while— 31—
in the case of supply disturbances it can be either reduced or increased. Like-
wise, the mean futures price is increased in the case of demand disturbances, while
it can be either decreased or increased in the case of supply disturbances. In
most cases, the mean futures price is less than the mean spot price, although this
is not the case of supply disturbances with Parameter Set 1.
An interesting comparison of Rule 2 with Rule 1 is that the former has
a relatively greater impact on the mean than on the variance of the spot price.
For example, with Parameter Set 3, setting V10we find that for supply disturbances
a 9% reduction in the mean is associated with a .9%reduction in the variance.
With A =10in Rule 1, we find that a 10.6% reduction inthe mean is associated
with a 99% reduction in the variance. In allcases, the change in both mean prices
are always greater under Rule 1 than under Rule 2 (forequivalent values of the
intervention parameters). Parameter Set 3, with V= 100(not reported) repre-
sents the greatest impact obtained for all Rule 2simulations. While the effects
on the mean spot and futures prices are comparable inmagnitude than under Rule 1,
the effects on the corresponding variancesare considerably less.
In summary, we see that in terms of price and variancereduction, Rule 2
is substantially inferior to Rule 1.Indeed, in most cases, intervention by means
of such a rule will have a negligibleimpact on the market.
B. Welfare Effects
Since the welfare effects operate through themeans and variances of the
prices, the welfare effects essentially mirror them. Inparticular, in all but
Parameter Sets 1 and 3, the effectsare negligible. For the other two sets, the
effects can be summarized as follows
(i) The expected profit of producers declineswith intervention, if
disturbances originate with demand; it increasesin the case of supply disturbances.
Intervention in accordance with Rule 2 stabilizesprofit in the case of demand dis-
turbances, but destabilizes it for supply disturbances.Welfare of firms, as—32—
measured by E(V), declines in the case of demand disturbances, but increases in
the case of supply disturbances.
(ii) Consumers gain from intervention with demand disturbances; they may
either gain or lose in the case of supply disturbances.
(iii) The expected profit of speculators declines with intervention,
although they are stabilized as well. However, overall, the welfare of speculators
declines.
(iv) Private welfare, as measured by E(II) declines with intervention in
the case of demand disturbances; in the case of supply disturbances it may either
rise or fall. By contrast, private welfare, as measued by E(V) increases with
intervention in the case of demand disturbances; for supply disturbances it may
go either way.
(v) The government gains from intervention.
(vi) The overall gains from intervention are with one exception always
positive. The exception is in the case of supply disturbances, where the measure
E(IIT) is employed. In Parameter Set 1, the losses to consumers and speculators
may dominate the gains to other agents.
f 8. RULE 3: Hi = —P)
Representativesolutions for intervention via Rule 3 are set out in Tables
8 and 9. Only for parameter sets 1, 3, 4, and 10 did this rule have uniformly
substantial effects on the asymptotic distributions of prices. For parameter sets
5 and 6 significant effects could be generated for high degrees of intervention.
For all other other parameter sets the effects are negligible. Note that as
0. However, since for parameter sets 2, 7, 8, 9, the benchmark (no
intervention) values of are so small, there is little opportunity for the
present rule to stabilize the futures prices in these cases.—33—
A. Effects on Long—Run Distributions of Prices
Being symmetric with Rule 1, one would expect that intervention with Rule
3 to stabilize both the spot and futures prices (when effective). However, as can
be seen from the solutions given in Table 8, even though such a rule always stabilizes
the futures price (albeit by a negligible amount) it can destabilize the spot price;
e.g., parameter set 3 for ii= 10.The reason for this is that one effect of this
form of intervention is to reduce the slope of the supply curve and inventory
demand function and both of these are destabilizing influences. In the case of
parameter set 3, when p =10,these effects dominate all the other stabilizing
influences of the intervention. It is interesting to note that this case of
destabilization of the spot price is associated with inelastic consumer demand
and very high degrees of risk aversion for both producers and speculators. In
practice, since the empirical evidence suggests that farmers are not as risk
averse as the coefficients chosen for this parameter sets, the destabilization
of the spot price may in fact not be such a problem.
Despite the fact that high degrees of intervention in the futures mar-
ket can destabilize the spot price, futures market intervention via Rule 3 always
reduces the mean spot price. As for the other two rules, the mean futures price
is increased after intervention. In general, changes in both mean prices are
less than the corresponding changes achieved under Rule 1 and in some cases even
less than for Rule 2; see, e.g., parameter sets 1 and 3. Similarly, reductions
in both variances are relatively small. We noted that for Rule 1 a considerable
degree of spot and futures market stabilization could be achieved for relatively
low degrees of intervention. In contrast, intervention in the futures market can
achieve substantial stabilization in the futures market, but relatively little
stabilization of the spot price. In fact, as futures market stabilizationincreases,
spot price stabilization declines, until in particular cases, weget a reveral as
noted above and the spot price becomes destabilized.Furthermore, significant—34—
reductions in the variability of the futures price can be achieved only for high
degrees of intervention.
B. Welfare Effects
The allocation of the welfare effects resulting from intervention in
accordance with Rule 3 can be summarized as follows:
(i)If disturbances originate with demand, the expected profit of
producers always decreases with a low degree of intervention and increases with a
high degree of intervention. The response in the case of supply disturbances is
slightly less clear cut, although this same pattern generally applies in that case
as well. A low degree of intervention always stabilizes producer profits, a high
degree destabilizes them. The welfare of producers, as measured by E(V), follows
that of expected profit.
(ii) Consumers always gain from intervention with demand disturbances;
they may either gain or lose in the case of supply disturbances.
(iii) The effect of intervention on the expected profit of speculators is
somewhat mixed. In the case of demand disturbances it usually declines if the
degree of intervention is low and to increase if the degree of intervention is
high. In the case of supply disturbances, expected profit is increased, especially
if the degree of intervention is high. For either demand or supply disturbances
a low degree of intervention stabilizes speculator profit, while a high degree of
intervention destabilizes them. The welfare of speculators, as measured by E(VS),
generally, but not always, follows that of E(115).
(iv) Private welfare, as measured by E(ll), is increased when the degree
of intervention is high (p= 10).In the case of low degree of intervention, its
effects are much less sure and private welfare losses may be incurred. The same
comments apply when private welfare is measured by E(V).—35.-
(v) The government tends to gain when the degree of intervention is low
and to lose when it is high.
(vi) The total welfare gains from intervention are generally positive
or low degrees of intervention, but negative for high degrees of intervention.
These general results merit some additional comments. First, the gains
to consumers and producers under Rule 3 are always less than the gains achieved
under Rule 1, with the corresponding losses being greater. Similarly, total private
and overall total welfare gains are always lessfor Rule 3 than Rule 1, and indeed,
as noted above, it is possible to get. negative gains under the former.
Second, for Rules 1 and 2 it was found that speculators always lose from
intervention. A major difference for Rule 3 is that speculators can in fact gain.
Indeed, as the degree of intervention increases, so does the chance that speculators'
welfare will be positive; it will always be so for i= 100.Where speculators
lose under Rule 3, the losses are in fact less than the corresponding losses
achieved under Rule 1. Therefore speculators will always be better off under Rule 3
than under Rule 1. However, the same general conclusion cannot be drawn for compari-
Sons with Rule 2, as the latter was so ineffective in producing non—zero gains that
it is possible for Rule 3 to yield very small losses for speculators, compared with
the zero losses/gains under Rule 2.
A major divergence from the first two rules is that under Rule 3, the
stabilization authority may in fact lose. We can see from the expression for the
gains to the stabilization authority that whether or not gains or losses are achieved
depends essentially upon the relative sizes of x1 and x2, defined in (31). In the
expression for these gains, (3bc), r(x1—l) will always be negative. If x2 is close
to unity, then the chances for gains will be increased. However, for large values
of i,x2will tend to decline thus enhancing the possibility of losses. In fact,
from the simulation results we can conclude that the stabilization authority tends
to lose for p =10and always does so for p =100.—36—
Finally, we may note that whereas for Rules 1 and 2 total welfare was
greater than private welfare, this is not so for Rule3.On the contrary, as the
degree of intervention increases under Rule 3, society as a wholetends to lose,
this being always the case for p =100.This of course is due to the losses being
incurred by the stabilization authority in that case, which more than offset the
possible private gains.
9. FINAL COMMENTS
In this paper we have analyzed the effects of three alternative intervention
rules on the long—run distributions of both the spot and futures prices, together with
the welfare implications which stem from these effects. The results for each rule
have been summarized at the appropriate part of the text, with some comparisons being
made. Space limitations preclude further detailed discussion here, and we conclude
with some general observations.
As a general proposition we find that intervention in the futures market is
not as effective in stabilizing either the spot price or the futures price as is inter-
vention in the spot market. Indeed, the plausible rule of buying futures contracts
when their price is low and selling when they are high, while stabilizing the future
price, may actually destabilize the spot price. Furthermore, the analogous type
of rule undertaken in the spot market will always stabilize the futures price to
a greater degree than it does the spot price. The basic reason for these findings
is due to the impact that intervention has on the behavioral relationships of the
private sector. It underscores the need to develop the analysis in terms of a
utility maximizing framework.
The various rules we have considered can generate rather different dis—
tributionsof welfare gains, including the overall benefits. The first rule, of inter-
vening in the spot market has the greatest effect. The allocation of benefits depends
in part upon the sources of the disturbances. With demand shocks, consumers and govern-
ment gain at the expense of speculators and producers. With supply disturbances pro-
ducers and the government gain at the expense of speculators and consumers. Much—37—
the same emerges (although to a smaller degree) with Rule 2.In both these cases the
gains to society from intervention will generally (but not always) be positive.
In the case of Rule 3, however, the benefits depend crucially upon the degree
of intervention. However, a high degree of intervention, which may be needed in order
to generate significant stabilizing effects on the spot price, may in fact generate
overall welfare losses. In particular, it is likely to lead to losses by the stabili-
zation authority and will therefore not be favored by them.
As a final point, we may note that our analysis treats the numbers of
producers and speculators as being fixed exogenously. An important possibility is
that the introduction of price stabilization through intervention will influence
the number of participants in the market. An interesting extension of this analysis,
therefore, would be to allow the numbers of agents to be endogenously determined









a 0.10 0.50 1.00 2.00 10.00
0.10 0.50 1.00 2.00 10.00
1
0.20 1.00 4.00




2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
a 0.1 10 0.1 0.5 2 1 2 10 2 0.1
0.5 2 0.5 0.5 2 10 1 10 0.5
0.2 0.2 1 1 4 4 0.2 1
a 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.001





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Effects on Distributions of Prices: Rule 1
A. Demand Disturbances
Parameter Sets
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2
p
.7627 .0077 1.708 .3904 .0945 .1940 .0322 .0056 .1375 .7579
% Diff —77 —8 —89 —58 —30 —40 —18 —8 —34 —77
Zf
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% Diff —3.3 0 —18.0 —.1 —.01 —.08 —.02 0 —.04 —.07
16.6221 .8328 16.5528 9.9920 3.3315 3.3313 .8331 .9091 .8332 16.6658
2 Diff 0.7 0 4.79 0.1 0.02 0.04 0 0 0 .01
2
p
.0083 .0023 .0094 .0077 .006 .0071 .0043 .0019 .0067 .0083
Diff —99 —73 —100 —99 —96 —98 —89 —67 —97 —100
2f
p
























2 Diff —4.55 0 —20.68 —.18 —.04 —.20 —.16 0 —.08 —.09 i 16.6661. .8332 16.6660 9.9998 3.3332 3.3333 .8333 .9091 .8333 16.666










6 7 8 9 10
2
p .7676.0077 1.7100 .3907 .0946 .1940 .0323.0056 .1375 .7580
% Diff —77 —9 —89 —58 —30 —40 —18 —8 —34 —77
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2 Diff —.91 0 —12 .034 .006 —.04 —.024 0 —.024 —.012
16.7294 .8358 16.7253 10.0189 3.3376 3.3337 .8332 .9094 .8333 16.6678
2 Diff .18 —.012 2.7 —.033 —.012 .021 0 0 .012 .0018
2
p
.0083 .0023 .0094 .0077 .0060 .0071 .0043 .0019 .0067 .0083
I Diff —99 —73 —99 —99 —96 —98 —89 —69 —97 —99
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2 Diff .63 .02 —10.6 .18 .05 —.04 —.08 0 —.07 .02 i 16.6787.8343 16.6795 10.0038 3.33483.3337.8333 .9093 .8333 16.6669
2 Diff —.12 —.19 2.4 —.18 —.1 .02 .012 —.01 .012 —.004Table 5




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A.Producers
5E(fl') —1.64440.00003 —9.0216 —.0658—.0019 —.0015—.0024—.00002—.0014 —.2391
5[var n'(1)J —24.3307 0.0004—149.5554—9.1431—.3272 —1.3514—.0527—.00001 —1.2895—105.7742
SE(V1') —.42790.00001 —1.5438 —.0201—.0002 —.0048—.0022—.00002—.0007 —.1862
B. Consumers
6E(CS) 5.4456 .00041 32.4760 0.21580.0179 0.07820.01270.0006 0.0167 0.7501
C.Speculators
6E(JIS) —3.1450—.0002 —18.4657 —.0963—.1120 —.0516—.0087—.0005 —.0080 --.3121
6[var 11S(1)] —24.3307 0.0004—149.5554 —.0914—.0033 —1.3514—.0527—.00001 —1.2895 —1.0577
E(VS) —1.9284-.0003 —10.9879 —.0917—.0110 —.0449—.0085—.0005 —.0074 —.3068
D. Total Private Welfare
AE(H) 0.65640.0002 4.9886 0.0536—.096 0.01500.00160.000080.0073 0.1989
8E(V) 3.08950.0012 19.9443 0.10400.0067 0.02850.00200.000080.0086 0.2571
E.Government 0.38140.0039 0.8539 0.19520.0473 0.09700.01610.0028 0.0688 0.3789
F.Total Welfare
AE(rrT) 1.03780.0042 5.8425 0.2488—.0487 0.11200.01770.0029 0.0761 0.5778
6E(VT) 3.47090.0040 20.7982 0.29920.0054 0.12550.01810.0029 0.0174 0.6360
A10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A.Producers
AE(Tt) -2.36850.0004 —11.0190 —.1074 —.0058 —.0251-.0115—.0001 -.0018 -.2951
A[var 0P(1)J —34.9676-.0026-178.8472—16.2364-1.1234-3.3503—.5057-.00006—2.4155 144.0074
AE1V) -.62010.0005 -2.0767 —.0262 —.0002 -.0083—.0090—.0001 -.0006 -.2231
B.Consumers
6E(CS) 7.96240.0133 38.2890 0.6649 0.1569 0.36010.10360.0123 0.1785 1.4663
C. pçu1ators
AE(05) —4.3906-.0028 —21.5696 -.1919 —.0405 -.1324—.0477-.0046 -.0218
Afvar fl(l)) —34.9676-.0026—178.8472 —.1624 —.0112—3.3503—.5057—.00006 2.4155 1.4401
AE(VS) —2.6423-.0027 -12.6272 -.1838 -.0399 0.1157—.0452—.0046 -.0206 -.4576
0.Total Private Welfare
6E(H) 1.20330.0109 5.7004 0.3656 0.1106 0.20260.04440.0076 0.1549 0.7064
6E(V) 4.7000 0.01.11 23.5851 0.4549 0.1168 0.23610.04940.0076 0.1585 0.7856
E.Government 0.08290.0228 0.0944 0.0771 0.0601 0.07050.04260.0186 0.0672 0.0829
F.Total Welfare
AE(8T) 1.28620.0337 5.7948 0.4427 0.1707 0.27310.08700.0262 0.2221 0.7893
rE(VT) 4.7829 0.0339 23.6795 0.5320 0.1769 0.30660.09200.0262 0.2257 0.8685Table 5




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A. Producers
—2.7444 .00381 9.6925 .2765 .0550 .1220 .0163 .0029 .0841 .5978
[var 0P(1)] 15.04794 .00093 —54.202214.6024 .6130 —.2440 —.0655 .0003 —1.055965.5656
AE(V) —3.4968 .0037612.4027 .2035 .0519 .1232 .0166 .0029 .0846 .5650
B. Consumers
6E(CS) 1.1301 —.0036 17.9053 —.1543 —.0402 —.0570 —.0056—.0026—.0683 —.1068
C. Speculators
8E(115) 1.6911 —.00006—4.0033 —.0709 —.0102 —.0380 —.0086—.0005—.0077 —.2941
A[var flS(1)} 19.1727 .00238 —26.7348 .1551 .0069 .0053 —.0524 .0012—.9165 .6929
6E(V5) .7325 —.00018—2.6665 —.0787 —.0105 —.0380 —.0084—.0005—.0072 —.2976
D. Total Private Welfare
AE(fl) .0768 .0001523.5945 .0513 .0046.0270 .0071—.0002 .0081 .1969
E(V) —1.6342 —.0000227.6458 —.0295 .0012 .0282 .0026—.0002 .0091 .1606
E. Government
C. .3838 .00385 .8550 .1954 .0473 .0970 .0161 .0028 .0688 .3790
F. Total Welfare
6E(FIT) .4606 .0040 24.4495 .2467 .0519 .1240 .0232 .0026 .0769 .5759
6E(VT) —1.2504 .Q038328.5008 .1659 .0485 .1252 .0187 .0026 .0779 .5396
A =10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A. Producers
8E(rI) —3.9532 .0415 7.3380 .8133 .2793 .4443 .1226 .0333 .37301.3213
6[var JT(l)] 55.28 .0143—2.6510 48.97 3.78401.2638—.1981 .0045 —2.58421.92




AE(115) 5.6348 .00007 1.3503—.1247—.0353—.0801—.0440—.0045—.0216—.4302
A[var I1(1)] 60.730 .0265 28.16 .5057 .04031.8734—.1315 .0125 —2.1832 1.9704
SE(V5) 2.5983—.0013 —.0577 —.1500—.0373—.0895—.0434—.0046—.0205—.4401
0. Total Private Welfare
AE(ri) .6523 .0107 24.09 .3635 .1105 .2145 .0492 .0077 .1557 .7044
E(V) —5.148 .008622.8145 .0934 .0896 .1987 .0508 .0076 .1581 .5985
E. Government
G. .0829 .0228 .0944 .0771 .0601 .0705 .0426 .0186 .0672 .0829
F. Total Welfare
8E(flT) .7352 .033524.1844 .4406 .1706 .2850 .0918 .0263 .2229 .3873
AE(VT) —5.0651 .031422.9089 .1705 .1497 .2692 .0934 .0262 .2253 .68142 2
a a
p p




% Diff % Diff
% Diff % Diff








% Diff % Diff
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% Diff % Diff
% Diff % Diff
Table 6
= .5














—.1 —.1 —.222 —.272
.7616 .7360 .8122 .7813
-.4 -2 -.83 -3.8
=.5
17.4199 19.9707 16.510418.1421
—.26 —4.97 .042 —2.29
16.5160 16.0059 16.697916.3720






































1 3 1 3
A. Producers A. Producers
E(rI) —.3031 —5.87255E(fl) —2.043 —11.5065
[var 11P(1)] —3.7655—75.3054 [var 11P(1)] —27.4769 —175.5806
AE(V) —.1148 —2.1073E(V') —.6691 —2.7275
B. Consumers B. Consumers
êE(CS) 0.3735 8.3171E(CS) 3.5804 30.3564
C. Speculators C. Speculators
E(II5) —.4260 —8.6778 AE(flS) —3.1007—20.2136
A[var I1(l)] -3.7655-75.3054 [var ll(l)] -27.4769 -175.5806
E(V5) —.2377 —4.9126AE(V5) —1.7268—11.4346
D. Total Private Welfare 0. Total Private Welfare
AE(II) —.3556 —6.2332tE(fl) —1.5633 —1.3637
E(V) 0.0210 1.2972E(V5) 1.1845 16.1943
E.Government 0.4104 7.8656E. Government 1.9555 5.1514
F. Total Welfare F. Total Welfare
E(llT) 0.0548 1.6324E(flT) 0.3922 3.7877




1 3 1 3
A. Producers A. Producers
E(fl) 0.0502 1.9314E(H) 0.6379 8.6114
t[var rt(l)] —.2088—13.6422 [var 0P(1)] —1.7260 —34.0911
AE(V) 0.0606 2.6135E(V) 0.724210.3159
B. Consumers B. Consumers
E(CS) —.0588 3.4678 AE(CS) —.650913.2856
C. Speculators C. Speculators
E(H5) —.0181 —1.5437E(ll5) —.1463 —3.8160
A[varn(1)) -.1814-13.4447 A[var n5(l)] -1.4784—33.3667
AE(V5) —.0091 —.8714 AE(V5) -.0724 —2.1477
D.Total Private Welfare 0. Total Private Welfare
iE(R) —.0267 3.8555 AE(11) —.1593 18.081
tE(V) —.0073 5.2099E(v) .000921.4538
E.Government E. Government
G. 0.0249 1.5856 G. .1383 1.1788
F. Total Welfare F. Total Welfare
AE(IIT) —.0018 5.4411E(IIT) —.021 19.2598
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i/Asurvey of much of this literature is contained in Turnovsky (1978a). For a
more recent discussion of more recent developments see Newbery and Stiglitz (1981).
See, e.g., Turnovsky (1978b), Newbery and Stiglitz (1979).
See, for example, Working (1985), Stein (1961), Peck (1976), Turnovsky (1979 and
1983), and Kawai (1983).
-'See also Kawai (1983) for a similar framework.
futures contracts we consider are for single period which coincides with the
production period.
6/ - - — Theassumption that costs depene upon ptannea ratner than actual output can be justi-
fied if costs are incurred on non—stochastically determined inputs, chosen at the
time the production decision is made. The random fluctuations in output appearing
in revenue are due to stochastic disturbances in production conditions, which
occur after the inputs have been purchased.
The additive form of the disturbance term appearing in (2) corresponds to a produc-
tion function f(mt) of the form y f(m) + v, where m is a fector of inputs.
The result we shall obtain below, that production and futures trading decisions
may be "separated," depends on this assumption and would not hold for a more
general specification of the disturbance term y =f(mt,vp;see Danthine (1978).
-'Since the function (3) can be derived from formal expected utility maximization
under at best only highly restrictive conditions, we prefer to simply postulate
(3) on the grounds of being a plausible and familiar ad hoc ojective, which is
analytically tractable, rather than attempting to justify it in any very rigorous
way. The function is consistent with expected utility maximization if (i) the
utility function has constant absolute risk aversion and (ii) the spot price is
normally distributed and output is non—stochastic, in which case is normally
distributed. It is not consistent with expected utility maximization if the firm's
output is stochastic, since then uP will be non—normal. In this case the constant
absolute risk averse utility function can be handled using the method of Bray
(1981). The implied optimal decision rules for firms using this more general
procedure turn out to differ from those derived below by terms which are of O(l/nf).
Provided the number of firms is sufficiently large, as we are assuming, our
approach provides an adequate approximation to this more general procedure.
See Feder, Just and Schmitz (1980), although they assume =0.
10/
For simplicity, the model assumes a zero interest rate. Since the introduction
of such a rate would be exogenous to the market, its exclusion involves no essen—
tial loss of generality.
The fact that •t—l
may be negative is of no particular concern, since our
specification he refers to only the speculative component of inventory hold—
ings. To take care of the nonnegativity of total inventory holdings we simply
assume that a sufficiently large fixed stock of inventories are held for non—
speculative purposes to more than offset any short speculative position taken.—F 2—
More explicitly, one can introduce a based level of inventories i say and treat
the speculative decision as_involving the choice of (' —I).This leads to the
addition of the base level i in the inventory demand function and provided i is
taken to be sufficiently large, the problem of the nonnegativity of inventory
demand disappears.
the case of speculators, the demand functions (8a), (8b) would no longer
obtain with a multiperiod objective function if costs were in terms of change
in inventory holdings, say.
13/ . — Rules1 and 3 assume that the stabilization authorities know the equilibrium
level of spot and futures prices, respectively. An analysis of interven-
tion when the authorities do not know the target price exactly has been carried
out in a simple model (with only a spot market) by Turnovsky (l978b).
14/ . — Rulessuch as (22a) are prevalent in the recent literature analyzing exchange
market intervention.
15/ . .. . — Notethat Rule 1 requires the authorities to hold inventories of the commodity.
No account is taken of the carrying costs of these inventories in assessing the
costs and benefits of stabilization. Note further that the stocks of inventories





where I is the initial level. Asymptotically, the expected value of this con-
verges to the initial level, 10.
-'While these rules are arbitrarily specified, they are plausible. Both Rules 1
and 3 have well established histories in both theoretical and applied work.
One can of course specify an optimality criterion for the government and derive
a corresponding optimal intervention policy. For example, if the stabilization
authority chooses to maximize its utility of revenue from intervening in both
the spot and futures market, then one can derive G and H functions of the form
(8a), (8b), respectively. In this case, the effects of intervention can be
analyzed through changes in the parameters, d, k.
-'Note further, that as the variance of prices tends to zero, the futures price con-
verges to the equilibrium spot price.
18/The solution procedure essentially follows that of Turnovsky (1983)
-'The detailed derivations of the solutions under the various intervention regimes
are available from the authors.
--Note that we evaluate the welfare effects of the stabilization rules in terms of
their asymptotic properties. While this seems reasonable, and is standard procedure,
it may tell us little about the short run effects, especially when prices start from
some initial point distant from their long run equilibrium.—F3—
derivations of the welfare expressions (30) and (32) are available from the
authors on request.
reason for looking at the asymptotic one—period variance E{ll —Ei(ll)]is
that this is the asymptotic expectation of the variance measure appearingn the
welfare function. This is not to be confused with asymptotic variance of profit,
E[ll —E(rI)],which measures long—run variability.
aggregation of the government's profit form intervention with the sum of pri-
vate utilities is not entirely satisfactory. However, given that these utility
measures are assumed to reflect dollar evaluations, the aggregate provides a
measure for the potential for achieving Pareto optimality through redistribution.
-i'The equations were solved using a nonlinear solution subroutine contained in the
Australian National University Program library and is based on a method dis-
cussed in Brent (1973).
iThe following features of the benchmark solutions given in Table 3 merit atten-
tion:(i) the mean spot price P is lower under supply than under demand dis-
turbances; (ii) the mean futures priceP is higher under supply than under
demand disturbances; (iii) f< P under demand disturbances; (iv)f >Punder
supply disturbances; (v) the variances of the spot, and futures prices
respectively are both lower under demand disturbances than under supply dis-
turbances; (vi) the variance of the futures price is less than the variance of
the spot price.
-1The analogous tables for- values 1, 100 are available form the authors.
1See McCafferty and Driskill (1980).
the limiting case when A =andthe spot price is stabilized exactly, gains
to the stabilization authority are reduced to zero.